Introduction
Significant measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change need to be taken if the most severe of its harmful effects are to be prevented. But where should the costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation fall? In a recent article in this journal, entitled 'Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged', Simon Caney has sought to answer this question, defending what he calls a 'hybrid view'.
1 This view is of special interest because, as the name suggests, it appeals to several independently weighty moral considerations, giving particularly prominent roles to historical responsibility for pollution and current ability to pay.
In this article I argue that, despite its evident appeal, Caney's hybrid view has its own weaknesses. Its treatment of disadvantaged persons and their duties is especially problematic. The hybrid view's indifference to the circumstances polluters face and only partial reference to wider justice issues leaves some polluters unduly disadvantaged by harsh duties. Perhaps the biggest problem is that the very disadvantaged -the global poor -have very limited duties of climate justice on the hybrid view. Such weaknesses are absent from an alternative, equally pluralistic approach to assigning the costs of climate change-induced harm, which I simply call 'the pluralistic account'.
I start by describing the 'polluter pays principle' and 'ability to pay principle', and show how they are brought together attractively in Caney's hybrid view (section 2). I then offer three objections to Caney's position, under the headings 'the disadvantaged polluter', 'the disadvantaged saint', and the 'license to pollute ' (sections 3-5) . Towards the end of the paper I present my preferred pluralistic account, and show that it is not subject to the four objections (section 6-8).
Polluter pays, ability to pay, and the hybrid view
One well known account of where the costs of climate change abatement should fall is the polluter pays principle (PPP), which holds (roughly) that those agents who have created harmful climate change are responsible for the full cost of its abatement (204). 3 Caney suggests that corporations, sub-statal political authorities, and international financial institutions should also be subject to PPP (219-20; cf. Caney 2005) . 4 Shue 1993; 1995. Recognizing these limitations, Caney's favoured version of PPP, which we may distinguish as 'PPP*', not only leaves aside non-human and previous generation climate change costs but also those caused by the poor:
Persons should bear the burden of climate change that they have caused so long as doing so does not push them beneath a decent standard of living (PPP*) (218).
Caney proposes a 'history-sensitive' variant of the ability to pay principle (ATP)
to deal with the 'remainder': that is, to assign climate change mitigation and adaptation costs necessitated by nature, previous generations, or the global poor. 5 ATP simply states that costs of mitigation and adaptation should be met by the wealthy, in proportion to their wealth (204, 213). Caney's preferred variant of ATP, which he calls 'ATP**', states that costs of mitigation and adaptation should be met by the wealthy, in proportion to their wealth, but also assigns greater responsibilities to abate global warming to those whose wealth has been generated unjustly, in this generation or previous ones:
The duties to bear the Remainder should be borne by the wealthy but we should distinguish between two groups -(i) those whose wealth came about in unjust ways, and (ii) those whose wealth did not come about in unjust ways -and we should apportion greater responsibility to (i) than to (ii) (ATP**) (218).
Caney's approach to distributing the costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation, which he calls the 'hybrid view', consists of PPP* and ATP** arranged in lexical order, PPP* being applied first, and ATP** being applied only to the remainder left by PPP*.
PPP* and ATP** together form an attractive account of assigning climate change costs. PPP* introduces a strong element of 'responsibility sensitivity' while both PPP* and ATP** introduce a strong concern with the fairness of the distributive pattern: PPP* excuses the worst off from paying for their pollution, thereby advantaging them, while ATP** assigns remaining costs to wealthier persons, again benefiting the disadvantaged.
The main weakness of PPP* can be seen as being overcome by the addition of ATP** to handle the otherwise problematic remainder while the main weakness of ATP -its indifference to historical responsibility for climate change -is addressed by the move to ATP** and the lexical priority given to PPP*.
The real strength of Caney's view is these complementary characters of PPP* and ATP**. 6 But the view is not without its problems. In each of the next three sections I present a criticism of the hybrid view, the overall focus being on its treatment of disadvantage. There is a relation of the foregoing argument that may appeal even to the committed environmentalist who denies that big polluters should ever be subsidised by (relative) non-polluters. Among polluters there will be those who do so out of necessity (for warmth, say, or to produce drinking water in arid countries), and those who do not (perhaps they like powerful cars and the jetset lifestyle). Surely it is unfair to make these two groups pay the same for each kilo of carbon they emit. The first group are victims of circumstance, while the latter are simply indulgent consumers.
The disadvantaged polluter
In the course of defending his approach to human rights against climate changeinduced harms, Caney recognizes the distinction between fundamental interests and luxuries as morally weighty. 8 His account of assigning the costs of climate change would benefit from recognizing a similar distinction.
The disadvantaged saint
PPP* assigns climate change costs to polluters, rather than to the unjust in general. This generates the unacceptable result that someone who pollutes moderately and otherwise leads a life devoted to realising the ends of justice will face a greater liability than 7 someone who pollutes slightly less but has benefited from great injustices. The lower polluter may even be able to pollute less precisely because of those injustices -maybe they have spent their Nazi gold on wind turbines.
The obvious reply here is that principles for assigning the costs of climate change are not intended to resolve all injustices. Other principles do that. Two responses come to mind.
The first response concerns the coherence of Caney's position. Between introducing ATP and settling on ATP** Caney considers ATP*, which assigns climate change costs on the basis of levels of wealth and origins of wealth, with those whose wealth was generated in climate-endangering ways taking on more costs. Caney rejects this ATP* in favour of ATP**, which also assigns climate change costs on the basis of levels of wealth and origins of wealth, but with those whose wealth was generated in unjust ways taking on more costs. This is a good move to make, as there is no moral difference between a climate-endangering injustice and a non-climate endangering injustice of similar magnitude. But it undermines the suggestion that principles for assigning the costs of climate-induced harm can not be expected to address justice more generally. 9 Furthermore, while it is true that PPP* makes some allowance for wider distributive justice considerations, as it exempts the poor, wider distributive justice concerns are only partially accommodated, as above the poverty threshold all that matters is one's responsibility for pollution, not one's responsibility for injustice. This asymmetry in the structure of ATP** and PPP* does not appear to have a justification.
9 Cf. Caney's (2005, 763) suggestion that 'an adequate account of people's environmental responsibilities cannot be derived in isolation from an understanding of their 'economic' rights and duties'. 
The license to pollute
PPP* is 'poverty-sensitive' in that people below a certain level of wealth do not have to pay for their pollution (218). In this way PPP* is a partially 'sufficientarian' view -it says that the poor are entitled to special assistance to bring them up to a sufficient level of advantage. 11 A number of objections have been raised against sufficientarianism. One troubling issue is, as Richard Arneson puts it, that 'the underlying considerations we care about seem ineluctably scalar, so one would think fundamental moral principle should reflect this underlying moral fact'. 12 PPP* insists that there is some level of poverty at which persons are entitled to full relief from the cost of their pollution but marginally above which they must bear the full cost of their pollution. It is hard to justify such small differences in wealth making such huge differences in obligations.
There is a further objection raised against sufficientarian views that is especially important when considering PPP*. In general, sufficientarianism has the implication that those who are below the threshold are not obligated to meet the costs of the choices for which they are responsible. While this seems plausible to many people in cases of urgent need (for example, where an alcoholic needs a liver transplant), PPP* appears to be committed to a form of 'responsibility insensitivity' that is not widely accepted. It says that the poor have no duty to bear the costs of climate change, even for that part of climate change they have caused, if it improves their condition at all. This is to give the poor a license to pollute. Suppose a poor person has access to clean energy, but meets his heating needs with marginally cheaper but vastly more polluting coal. Surely, if we are concerned by global warming, we should be concerned with discouraging such behaviour? As Caney himself puts it, '[w]e should not take pollution as a given and then act in a reactive fashion: rather, we should be pro-active and take steps to minimize the likelihood of excessive pollution'. 13 Merely reacting to the poor's pollution rather than deterring it is bad for the climate and has no justification from justice.
It may seem that I misinterpret Caney here. He says, after all, 'that if one holds, as I do, that people should not fall beneath a certain standard of living then the Polluter Pays 12 Arneson 2010.
Principle should be qualified to prevent it being the case that people are made to pay for emissions needed for their fundamental survival' (213). So it may be suggested that Caney would only allow the poor to forgo the environmental cost of their pollution if it was essential for their survival. But I think that Caney intends the exemption to be much broader. Elsewhere, including in the formal statement of PPP* (218), the 'fundamental survival' condition for exemption is replaced with a much less strict 'decent standard of living' condition. This exemption is supported with the thought that 'the standard of living in China is much lower than the USA' (213). The fact that Caney describes his principle as 'poverty-sensitive' rather than, say, 'survival-sensitive', also suggests that he has in mind a principle that would exempt the majority of the Chinese population given that they are much poorer than most Americans. It seems, then, that PPP* would exempt poor people from paying for pollution that makes their lives slightly better, even if it will make the lives of other people -including equally poor people -much worse. This approach to giving the poor special treatment is wrong because it only considers one side of the equation: it minimizes their duties to bear costs, but ignores the fact that this undermines the rights of all, and especially the poor, to be protected from climate change.
Though ATP** ensures that the wealthy are obliged to cover the cost of emissions generated by the poor, it is surely undesirable to increase the overall amount of emissions that have to be met in this way, especially as some emissions may have effects that are beyond the capacity of the rich to abate.
Now it is true that, in some places, Caney does seem to want to assign duties to the poor. He says that 'it is worth noting that although I have argued that the most advantaged have a leading responsibility to play, my argument also places duties on the least advantaged as well. For if they can develop in ways that do not involve high levels of fossil fuel combustion, and can do so without great cost to themselves, then it would be wrong for them to pursue a high emissions policy' (220). The way that the argument is supposed to place duties on the disadvantaged is by ensuring that the worst off have the 'ability to attain a decent standard of living' (213, my emphasis). In correspondence Caney notes that this 'builds in a kind of responsibility-sensitivity', and clarifies that '[t]he core idea' is that '[p]ersons are allocated those emissions needed to grant them the "ability" to attain a decent standard of living and persons are then responsible for how they use these emissions'. As he puts it elsewhere: 'Each person is entitled to that level of emissions required for them to attain a minimal decent standard of living'.
14 I have two comments on this line of response. First, there is strong textual evidence to suggest that Caney's concern is with ensuring the poor have a decent minimum of living, not only with ensuring that they have the ability to achieve this minimum. The main statement of PPP* does not mention the poor's ability or any similar notion, but is rather concerned with 'not pushing them beneath a decent standard of living' (218). And in explaining the rationale for PPP*, Caney says that 'if one holds, as I do, that people should not fall beneath a certain standard of living then the Polluter Pays
Principle should be qualified' (213). So while Caney now holds that the poor's ability to achieve a decent minimum is what matters, this is at odds with at least some of what he has written. In particular, it constitutes a substantive revision of PPP*.
Second, while the 'ability' response does indeed introduce an element of responsibility sensitivity, it does not do so in a way that fully addresses the problem of the polluting poor. To take the earlier example, suppose that the difference in price between coal and clean energy, small as it is, is the difference between a decent minimum being achievable and a decent minimum being impossible. In that case, even a revised, ability-focused version of PPP* would have to allow the poor to choose the much more polluting option without facing any penalty, as without coal the poor cannot achieve the decent minimum. While we should, of course, have special concern for the poor, there is surely some limit to the amount of emissions they should be allowed to emit without penalty, even if those emissions are necessary for them to have the ability to achieve a decent standard of living.
A Pluralistic Approach
The hybrid view has a problem with disadvantage: it disadvantages some polluters in spite of their already difficult circumstances; it disadvantages others in spite of their overall contribution to justice; and it allows the disadvantaged poor to pollute with impunity.
In spite of the above criticism, I believe that Caney is correct to favour a view that draws on several opposed moral considerations when assigning the costs of climate change. Indeed, I believe that, in focusing on responsibility and in giving the worst off Utilitarians are wrong to suggest that justice, properly construed, can be reduced to promoting utility. 15 But there is also more to justice than the view that we should solely be concerned with making the worst off fare as well as they can, 16 or the luck egalitarian view that we should focus on making distributions reflect individual choices.
17
I suggest, however, that these three approaches to justice -that is, utilitarian justice, Rawlsian justice, and luck egalitarian justice -taken together constitute an appealing account of distributive justice. In other words, my suggestion is that a distribution is better, the more it (1) increases overall levels of advantage, (2) increases the levels of advantage of the worst off, and (3) increases the extent to which levels of advantage correspond to responsible action, in the sense that, the more (morally or prudentially) praiseworthy a choice is, the greater are the benefits associated with it. considerations.
Three objections revisited
I will now explain why the pluralistic account is not subject to the three objections I have advanced against the hybrid view.
The disadvantaged polluter revisited. The pluralistic account recognizes that it is unfair to make people in cold countries pay the full carbon cost of heating themselves because that makes them disadvantaged through no fault of their own relative to people in temperate countries, who can be warm at a low carbon cost without having to go through the expense and upheaval of relocation. Part of the burden of disadvantaged polluters should be passed on to the rest of the global population on account of the pluralistic account's concern with making distributions reflect praiseworthiness, rather than where people happen to be born. But it recognizes that, given utilitarian concerns with efficiency and greater disadvantages held by others, it may be appropriate for disadvantaged polluters to pay some of their excess carbon costs. That is, disadvantaged polluters should be given some incentive to seek less polluting lifestyles, which dovetails with the fact that the globally most disadvantaged can not usually be expected to pick up a share of the disadvantaged polluters' tab. The pluralistic account also generally recognizes the significant moral difference between victims of circumstance, who have to pollute to secure an adequate level of well-being, and indulgent consumers of polluting luxuries, treating the first group as more praiseworthy and less advantaged and thus entitled to greater assistance.
The disadvantaged saint revisited. The pluralistic account is obviously not subject to the objection that it would treat the clean tyrant better than the polluting saint. It does not distinguish between climate injustice and other injustices, and would recognize the saint as in possession of a lower level of advantage than that to which he is entitled, given the character of his choices, while the reverse is true of the tyrant.
The license to pollute revisited. The pluralistic account is not committed to any cut-off point, beyond which people are considered so poor that they cannot be given significant duties. It has the means to impose the necessary penalties on polluting activity among the poor on account of both the utilitarian and luck egalitarian strands of the view.
Someone who increases carbon emissions decreases overall levels of advantage and in so doing becomes less praiseworthy, so there is both a direct (responsibility-based) and indirect (utilitarian incentive-based) argument for decreasing their level of advantage. This is to be balanced against the Rawlsian case for increasing the poor's level of advantage. In some cases, making the poor pay for their pollution -for instance, through a tax on coal fires -will improve the overall position of the worst off as the cost of the duties they are thereby under is outweighed by increased protection of their rights against being harmed by climate change. The pluralistic approach reflects the fact that justice has a special concern for the poor, but it does not interpret that as giving them carte blanche to pollute.
Conclusion
I conclude that the pluralistic account provides a more compelling account of assigning the costs associated with climate change than does Caney's hybrid model. The pluralistic
